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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CHERIFF SARKIS MAHI, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040080-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion for failing to consider or grant Malii's 
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1? Utah Code Annotated § 
77-29-1 grants a trial court discretion for reviewing a determination that a defendant's 
charges should be dismissed pursuant to the Speedy Trial Statute. See State v. Coleman, 
2001 UT App 281,1}3, 34 P.3d 790. This issue was preserved in an oral motion to 
dismiss made prior to trial (R. 165 at 26-27). 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mahi's motion for a 
mistrial after the State introduced inflammatory evidence that he was incarcerated? See 
State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah 1998). This issue was preserved in an oral 
motion made during trial (R. 130-33). 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Cheriff Sarkis Mahi appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Third District Court, after he was convicted by a jury of 
aggravated burglary, robbery, and aggravated assault. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Cheriff Sarkis Mahi was charged by information filed in Third District Court on or 
about May 15, 2003, with aggravated burglary, a first degree felony; robbery, a second 
degree felony; and two counts of assault, class B misdemeanors (R. 2-3). An amended 
information was filed on July 8, 2003, which changed the charged offenses to the 
following: Count I - Aggravated Burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-6-203; Count II - Robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-6-301; and Count III - Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-103 (R. 41-42). 
On June 20, 2003, Mahi signed a demand for a 120-day disposition while serving a 
jail commitment (R. 45). The demand was not signed by the authorized jail agent until 
July 15,2003 (R. 45). 
On August 26, 2003, a preliminary hearing was held and Mahi was bound-over for 
trial on all charged upon a finding of probable cause (R. 48-49). The preliminary hearing 
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was originally set for July 8, 2003, but was continued because Mahi was not transported 
to the court (R. 39-40). The preliminary hearing was continued on July 15, 2003, because 
Mahi was again not transported to court (R. 43-44). Finally, the hearing was again 
continued on August 5, 2003, for an unspecified reason (R. 48-49). 
On October 28-29, 2003, a jury trial was held with Judge Dennis Frederick 
presiding (R. 85-86, 135-36). During trial, Mahi made a motion for a mistrial because the 
State had mentioned that he was in jail (R. 165 at 130-33). The motion was denied by the 
trial court (Id.). After deliberation, the jury convicted Mahi of all three charges (R. 128-
130). 
On January 23, 2004, Mahi was sentenced to consecutive terms of 5 years to life, 
1-15 years, and 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison; and he was ordered to pay $2,100.00 in 
restitution (R. 142-44). 
On January 26, 2004, Mahi filed notice of appeal in Third District Court (R. 145). 
On February 4, 2004, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4) (R. 159). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Testimony of Benito Gonzales-Torres 
Benito Gonzales-Torres (Benito) and Juan were living in a one-room apartment in 
Salt Lake City on April 25, 2002 (R. 165 at 38). Benito slept in the living room on the 
sofa and Juan slept in the bedroom (R. 165 at 38). Sometime during the night, two men 
kicked down the door and entered, saying they were the F.B.I, and they wanted to know 
where the money and drugs were (R. 165 at 38-39, 52). The two men were wearing a 
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black mask and one was holding a radio and speaking into it (R. 165 at 39, 52). One of 
them hit Benito on the face with a flashlight and threw him to the ground (R. 165 at 39). 
Benito testified that Cheriff Mahi was the one that struck him with the flashlight (R. 165 
at 40). 
Benito testified that one man held him down while Mahi searched the room 
"turning everything over" (R. 165 at 41). Benito thought Mahi was looking for 
something, but he did not know what he would be looking for (R. 165 at 43). After a 
while the man holding him down let go and went into the kitchen (R. 165 at 41). Benito 
thought the men stole his wallet which contained about $1,600 dollars, a check, and some 
change (R. 165 at 41-42). The man holding him down rubbed Benito's face into the 
carpet and stole his rings from his finger (R. 165 at 41, 43, 45). 
During the incident, a woman came to the door presumably to purchase drugs (R. 
165 at 56). Benito did not know who the lady was because he was on the floor (R. 165 at 
56). The attackers pulled the lady into the apartment and knocked her on the floor (R. 
165 at 56). 
Benito also testified that he was hit with the flashlight just before the men left his 
apartment (R. 165 at 43). Benito testified that Mahi still had the black mask on, but it 
was only on above his eyebrows (R. 165 at 62). Benito yelled for help and his cousin 
Alfredo and a Victor came to help (R. 165 at 47). Benito then hit the man holding him 
down about three or four times and then chased after Mahi (R. 165 at 47-48). Benito did 
not see where Mahi went and by that time, the police arrived and told Benito to go back to 
his apartment (R. 165 at 48). 
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Benito testified that he saw his attacker again around December 4 (R. 165 at 48). 
Benito saw a police officer and called him over and pointed out the man that attacked him 
(R. 165 at 49). Police then arrested Mahi (R. 165 at 49). 
Benito identified Mahi as his attacker in a police line up (R. 165 at 57-58). Benito 
testified that Mahi had changed his appearance (R. 165 at 58). Benito testified that he 
never met Mahi or the other attacker before (R. 165 at 59). 
Testimony of Victor Gutierrez 
Victor Gutierrez was living with Benito Gonzales-Torres on April 25, 2002 (R. 
165 at 64). Sometime that night, a man entered his room and began searching his pants 
and wallet (R. 165 at 65). Victor could not see the man's face (R. 165 at 65). The man 
was wearing blue clothing and a hat (R. 165 at 66). The man told Victor to stay put and 
not move then he went back in the living room where Benito was (R. 165 at 66). Victor 
did not leave his room (R. 165 at 66). 
Victor knew Mahi before this incident occurred, but he did not see the man that 
searched him (R. 165 at 67). Victor testified that the men did not have permission to 
enter the apartment (R. 165 at 68). 
Testimony of Shellie Woods 
Shellie Woods is a police officer for the Salt Lake City Police Department (R. 165 
at 73). On April 25, 2002, Woods responded to a report of a fight near 564 East 600 
South (R. 165 at 74). As Woods drove to the location, she saw a male running westbound 
from the reported address (R. 165 at 74). She pulled over and talked to the man, but she 
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could not understand him because he did not speak English (R. 165 at 75-76). The man 
directed Woods back to his apartment (R. 165 at 76). 
At the apartment, Woods noticed that the doorframe had been damaged (R. 165 at 
76). Woods could tell that there had been a physical altercation at the apartment and she 
saw two men detaining another man, Blaine Black (R. 165 at 80). Woods did not speak 
to the two men detaining Black because they spoke only Spanish (R. 165 at 80). Black 
had some facial injuries (R. 165 at 79). The other two men did not have any injuries (R. 
165 at 79). Woods also testified that the man she first saw, Benito, had a laceration on 
one of his fingers (R. 165 at 79). 
Woods arrested Black, searched him, and found a pocket knife and a gold colored 
ring in his pocket (R. 165 at 81). Woods never saw Mahi at the scene, even when she saw 
Benito running down the street (R. 165 at 86). 
Testimony of Blaine Black 
Blaine Black testified that he was convicted of aggravated burglary and robbery as 
a result of the incident occurring on April 25, 2002 near 564 East 600 South (R. 165 at 
88). Black testified that he knew the apartment was a drug house, but he never had 
purchased drugs there (R. 165 at 101). Black testified that on that night he was out to 
"help a friend" because two men "were supposed to have raped his girlfriend" (R. 165 at 
89-90). Black testified he was there only to "scare 'em" (R. 165 at 91). Black said his 
friend's name was Reef, and identified him as the defendant (R. 165 at 89). 
Black did not see Reef enter the apartment because he was outside on the driveway 
(R. 165 at 90). Reef was already in the apartment holding a man down when he arrived, 
and he went in and helped Reef hold him down (R. 165 at 91). 
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Black did not know if Reef took anything from the apartment, nor did he see Reef 
hit Benito with the flashlight (R. 165 at 92). Although at his own trial, Black testified 
that Reef hit Benito with the flashlight (R. 165 at 94). 
Black testified that he was kicked in his liver by someone else and was unable to 
escape even though Reef left the apartment (R. 165 at 94). 
Black knew Reef for four of five years prior to this incident (R. 165 at 92). Black 
testified that he occasionally used drugs with Mahi (R. 165 at 102). 
Black also testified that the person that was with him that night may have been 
someone other than Mahi, and that if he was trying to protect the other person, he would 
not say who the person was (R. 165 at 101-02). However, Black also testified that Reef 
was Mahi (R. 165 at 107). 
Testimony of David Hendricks 
David Hendricks is a police officer with the Salt Lake City police department (R. 
165 at 108). On December 4, 2002, Hendricks was near 567 East 600 South on routine 
patrol and saw three individuals chasing two other people (R. 165 at 109). Hendricks 
stopped one of the persons, Benito Gonzalez, and questioned him (R. 165 at 109). Benito 
told Hendricks about the prior incident and that he was chasing the alleged assailant (R. 
165 at 110). Hendricks then stopped Mahi and asked for his I.D. (R. 165 at 110). Mahi 
told Hendricks he did not have any I.D. and he told Hendricks that his name was Scott 
Slagle (R. 165 at 110). Hendricks arrested Mahi and later discovered his real name (R. 
165 at 111). 
Testimony of Frank Werner 
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Frank Werner was employed with the Salt Lake City Police Department on 
December 4, 2002 (R. 165 at 113). Werner interviewed Mahi that day and Mahi told 
Werner that his name was Scott Slagle (R. 165 at 114). Werner asked Mahi about the 
incident on April 25, 2002, but Mahi denied any involvement or knowledge of the matter 
(R. 165 at 115). The next day, Werner discovered Mahi's real name (R. 165 at 115). 
Testimony of Doug Olsen 
Doug Olsen works for the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office as the jail admit 
officer and the lineup coordinator (R. 165 at 117). On June 26, 2003, Olsen conducted a 
lineup with Mahi and five other individuals (R. 165 at 118). Eiefore the lineup, Olsen 
noticed that Mahi had changed his appearance by shaving the top center portion of his 
hair and growing "an Amish beard" (R. 165 at 120). Olsen told Mahi not to change his 
appearance any further (R. 165 at 120). While Olsen was picking other people to 
participate in the lineup, he received a phone call from the jail housing unit officer stating 
that Mahi had attempted to color his face with what appeared to be pencil lead (R. 165 at 
120). When Olsen picked Mahi up for the lineup, he saw what appeared to be pencil lead 
on his face (R. 165 at 121). 
Testimony of Nathaniel Cahoon 
Nathaniel Cahoon works for the Salt Lake County Corrections Department and on 
June 26, 2003, Cahoon saw Officer Olsen speak to Mahi and inform him that he would be 
participating in a lineup that day (R. 165 at 125-26). After Olsen left, Cahoon saw Mahi 
wipe a gray substance on his face, making his face "noticeably grayer" (R. 165 at 127). 
Cahoon asked Mahi why he was wiping stuff on his face, and Mahi told him he was 
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trying to darken his skin to match the skin tone of the other participants in the lineup (R. 
165 at 128). Cahoon did not tell Mahi to wash it off (R. 165 at 128). 
Testimony of Cherrif Mahi 
Cheriff Mahi testified that he knows Victor through various drug deals in the 
neighborhood and that he had purchased cocaine from Victor at his apartment at 564 East 
600 South (R. 165 at 135). Mahi also knows Benito through the same transactions (R. 
165 at 135). Mahi testified that he uses drugs and that he purchased drugs from that 
apartment (R. 165 at 136). 
Mahi testified that he could not remember what he was doing on April 25, 2002 
(R. 165 at 136). Mahi testified that he did know Blaine Black, but he did not go with 
Black to that residence on April 25, 2002 (R. 165 at 136-37). 
Mahi admitted that he lied to the officers when he was arrested on December 4, 
2002 about his name and birth date (R. 165 at 137). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First, Mahi asserts that the State failed to bring this case to trial within the 120-day 
disposition period pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1. Mahi made an oral 
motion to dismiss prior to trial asserting that the State failed to comply with his demand 
for a speedy trial. However, the trial court essentially disregarded the motion and failed 
to review the proceeding as required by § 77-29-1(4). Mahi asks this Court to reverse his 
conviction with prejudice because the State failed to comply with Utah Code Annotated § 
77-29-1. 
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Second, Mahi asks that this Court find that the trial court abused its discretion in 
failing to declare a mistrial after the State introduced inflammatory evidence that he was 
incarcerated. Alternatively, Mahi asks that this Court find that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to request a curative instruction from the trial court in regards to 
this evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION FOR FAILING TO 
CONSIDER AND GRANT MAHFS MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE 
TRIAL WAS NOT BROUGHT WITHIN THE 120-DAY DISPOSITION PERIOD 
On June 20, 2003, Mahi signed a demand for 120-day disposition, requiring the 
State to bring this case to trial within 120 days (R. 45). However, this case was not 
brought to trial until October 28, 2003, pushing the trial date beyond the 120-day period. 
Before trial began, Mahi's trial counsel brought to the trial court's attention that the 120-
day disposition had expired, made a motion to dismiss on the day of trial pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 77-29-1, but the trial court refused to consider the motion and failed to 
hold a hearing on the matter (R. 165 at 26-27). Mahi asserts that the trial court abused its 
discretion for failing to consider the matter and to order the case dismissed because the 
State failed to comply with the § 77-29-1 by not bringing the case to trial within 120 days. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1 grants a trial court discretion for reviewing a 
determination that a defendant's charges should be dismissed pursuant to the Speedy Trial 
Statute. See State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281,1J3, 34 P.3d 790, cert denied 42 P.3d 
951. 
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"Pursuant to section 77-29-1, whenever a Utah prisoner has an untried indictment 
or information, that prisoner can demand that the charges be brought to trial within 120 
days of the demand." State v. Wagenrnan, 2003 UT App 146, f 6, 71 P.3d 184. "Section 
77-29-1 directs the court to dismiss criminal charges against a defendant if that defendant 
is not tried within 120 days of invoking section 77-29-1(4), unless 'good cause [is] shown 
in open court.'" Id. (quoting Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1(3) to (4)). The matter is 
also dismissed with prejudice. Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146 at [^9; accord Utah Code 
Annotated §77-29-1(4). 
The burden of complying with the statute rests with the prosecutor. State v. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d 911,915 (Utah 1998). Once a prisoner has delivered a disposition 
request, "the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter heard 
within the statutory period." Id. Thus, a defendant need not even object to a trial setting 
that falls outside the required time period. Id: accord State v. Peterson, 810 P.2d 421, 424 
(Utah 1991). Instead, the prosecutor must "notify the court that a detainer notice has been 
filed," and he must otherwise "make a good faith effort to comply with the statute." 
Heaton, 958?.3d at 915. 
Determining whether a motion to dismiss pursuant to the detainer statute is proper 
"requires a two-step inquiry. First, we must determine when the 120-day period 
commenced and when it expired. Second, if the trial was held beyond the 120-day period, 
we must then determine whether 'good cause' excused the delay." Wagenman, 2003 UT 
App 146 at |^8 (citations omitted). 
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A. The Detaomer Period Commenced on June 30, 2003. 
By the statute's plain terms, "the 120-day period commences on the date written 
notice is delivered 'to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any 
appropriate agent of the same.'" State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 916 (Utah 1998) (quoting 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1(1)). Mahi asserts that he delivered his written notice of 
demand for the 120 day disposition period on June 20, 2003 to the proper authorities (R. 
45; 165 at 28-29). However, for some unknown reason, the jail authorities did not sign 
the notice until July 15, 2003 (R. 45; 165 at 28-29). Mahi's trial counsel also brought this 
matter to the attention of the trial court on October 28, 2003 before the commencement of 
trial (R. 165 at 5, 28-29). The trial court refused to consider the matter, but noticed that 
there was a discrepancy between the date of Mahi's delivery of the written demand and 
the date the jail authorities signed it (R. 165 at 29). Instead of reviewing the proceeding 
as required by Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1(4), the trial court stated, "without ruling 
on the propriety or impropriety of the motion, you have preserved your record in that 
regard" (R. 165 at 29-30). 
B. The Detainer Period Expired October 18, 2003. 
The 120th day after June 20, 2003, was October 18, 2003. Trial was held on 
October 28, 2003 (R. 165). There is no showing on the record of any event that would 
qualify as "good cause" which would excuse the delay of bringing the matter to trial 
within the 120-day period. In fact, the only delay in the proceedings was in the date of 
the preliminary hearing which had to be continued twice because Mahi was not 
transported from the jail (R. 43-44, 48-49). 
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Section § 77-29-1 clearly places the burden of complying with the statute on the 
prosecutor. Moreover, any good cause determination to delay trial must be "shown in 
open court." Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146 at^j 15 (quoting § 77-29-1(3)). Instead of 
refusing to consider the motion, the trial court was required to determine on the record "in 
open court" whether there was good cause not to bring Mahi to trial within the statutory 
period of time. Accordingly, Mahi's convictions must be dismissed with prejudice 
because he was not tried prior to October 18, 2003. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
GRANT A MISTRIAL WHEN THE STATE INTRODUCED 
INFLAMMATORY EVIDENCE THAT MAHI WAS IN CUSTODY 
Mahi asserts that the trial court abused its discretion for failing to grant a mistrial 
when the State introduced inflammatory and irrelevant evidence that Mahi was a prisoner, 
thereby violating his rights to a fair trial. 
"The decision to grant or deny a mistrial... rests within the sound discretion of the 
trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Calliham, 
2002 UT 86,^142, 55 P.3d 573. "Unless a review of the record shows that the court's 
decision is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the 
defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial, we will not find that the court's decision 
was an abuse of discretion." State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57,f 38, 993 P.2d 837. 
It is well established that prior bad acts evidence is not admissible "to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." State v. Holhert, 
2002 UT App 426,1J29, 61 P.3d 291 (quoting Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404(b)). 
Moreover, 
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[W]e have numerous rules of evidence that prohibit the introduction of defendant's 
past criminal conduct solely to assure that a case will be decided on the facts 
untainted by past misconduct. It is axiomatic that cases should be decided on the 
facts, and not on prejudice, by whatever means the prejudice may insinuate itself. 
The potential effect on the minds of jurors in attempting to apply the presumption 
of innocence and the standard requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt to the 
evidence in a criminal case, require it. 
Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 345 (Utah, 1980). 
Rule 404(b) prevents the introduction of evidence that might impermissibly show a 
propensity to commit crime. See State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, |^56, 52 P.3d 1210. Thus, 
"one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the 
basis of the evidence introduced at trial...." State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, ^ [20, 40 P.3d 611 
(citation omitted). 
In this case, during the State's case in chief, Doug Olsen and Nathaniel Cahoon, 
who both worked at the county jail, were called to the stand to testify regarding Mahi's 
appearance during a lineup (R. 165 at 117, 125). Both repeatedly testified that Mahi was 
an inmate in jail (R. 165 at 120, 124, 126, 127, 127). Mahi asserts that this inadmissible 
evidence violated his rights to a fair trial since this evidence impermissibly tends to show 
a propensity to commit crime, thereby unfairly prejudicing the jury against him. Mahi 
asserts that because the jury knew he was in jail, the prejudicial effect upon the jury is 
similar to Chess, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980). 
In Chess, the defendant was tried before a jury in identifiable prison clothes. The 
defendant told his trial counsel that he objected to wearing prison clothes at trial; 
however, his trial counsel failed to make an objection at trial and the defendant was 
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convicted of aggravated robbery. 617 P.2d at 344. The defendant claimed on habeas 
relief that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to his appearing in prison 
clothes. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court determined that "[t]he [defendant] should not be held 
responsible for counsel's failure to make an objection to protect a basic constitutional 
right, especially when it is difficult to conceive of a valid tactical or strategic reason for 
not objecting." Chess, 617 P.2d at 344. The Court then overturned the conviction, 
holding, "The prejudicial effect that flows from a defendant's appearing before a jury in 
identifiable prison garb is not measurable, and it is so potentially prejudicial as to create a 
substantial risk of fundamental unfairness in a criminal trial." Id. The Court further 
added, "Indeed, we have numerous rules of evidence that prohibit the introduction of 
defendant's past criminal conduct solely to assure that a case will be decided on the facts 
untainted by past misconduct. It is axiomatic that cases should be decided on the facts, 
and not on prejudice, by whatever means the prejudice may insinuate itself. The potential 
effect on the minds of jurors in attempting to apply the presumption of innocence and the 
standard requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the evidence in a criminal case, 
require it." Id. at 345. 
Mahi asserts that evidence regarding his status has an inmate prejudiced the jury 
against him because it impermissibly led the jury to believe that he was a person of low 
moral character, thereby making it impossible for the jury to consider the facts of this case 
independent of past misconduct. Similar to Chess, where the prejudicial effect of a 
defendant appearing in prison clothes "is not measurable," 617 P.2d at 344, Mahi asserts 
that the same prejudicial effects exist when the jury impermissibly learns that a defendant 
is currently incarcerated. Moreover, like Chess, impermissible evidence of incarceration 
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"is so potentially prejudicial as to create a substantial risk of fundamental unfairness in a 
criminal trial.5' Id. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mahi's 
motion for mistrial because this evidence impermissibly tainted the minds of the jury, thus 
denying him a fair trial. 
In the alternative, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a curative 
instruction that the jury was not to consider Mahi's incarceration in determining the 
charges against him. 
"In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim, appellant 
must show that his trial counsel's performance was deficient, in that 'it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness,' and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
outcome of the trial.'" State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. 
Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687-88, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)); accord State v. 
Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App. 1993). 
After trial counsel made a motion for mistrial, the trial court denied the motion but 
then asked trial counsel if he wanted the jury provided with an instruction that they are to 
disregard the issue of Mahi's custody (R. 165 at 133). Trial counsel did not respond to 
the request, and the record shows no curative instruction was given (R. 165 at 133). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that curative instructions are sometimes 
necessary to ensure a fair trial. For example, in State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 
1998), the Court stated that it presumes a jury "will follow an instruction to disregard 
inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it...." Id. at 273. Thus, curative 
instructions may be appropriate remedies "unless there is an 'overwhelming probability' 
that the jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that 
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the effect of the evidence would be 'devastating' to the defendant." Id. (quoting Greer v. 
Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987)). Mahi asserts that in the 
alternative that this Court finds that a curative instruction would have been sufficient to 
cure this issue, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an appropriate 
instruction. But for this failure, Mahi would not have been denied his right to a fair and 
impartial jury. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Mahi asks that this Court conclude that he was not 
brought to trial within 120-days and that therefore, his convictions must be reversed and 
the matter dismissed. Alternatively, he asks that this Court find that the trial court abused 
its discretion in failing to grant his motion for mistrial and/or that trial counsel was 
ineffective in failing to request a curative instruction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of November, 2004. 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, first-class mail postage pre-paid, four (4) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney 
General, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, 
this 15th day of November, 2004. 
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Wesfckw 
UT ST § 77-29-1 Page 1 
U C A 1953 § 77-29-1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Nil Chapter 29. Disposition of Detainers Against Prisoners 
-•§ 77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending charge—Duties of 
custodial officer—Continuance may be granted—Dismissal of charge for failure 
to bring to trial 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison, 
]ail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and ther^ is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, 
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer m 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying the 
nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought 
to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described m Subsection (1) , shall immediately cause the demand to be forwarded by 
personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate 
prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or custodial ofticer 
shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, provide the attorney 
with such information concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner 
as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required m Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown m open 
court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds 
that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the 
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2. 
UNIFORM MANDATORY DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS ACT 
<For text of Uniform Act and variation notes and annotation materials for 
adopting jurisdictions, see Uniform Laws Annotated, Master Edition, Volume 
11A.> 
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
£ s i L~ n 
NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGES' L u u 
(120 DISPOSITION NOTICE PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN^7-2$-107 *n |Q: 3" 
// 
CLERK OF -»li DISTRICT CCt , r / / 
-> / ^/S'iStlhL'r^EPARTHfNT 2T * 
TO: JAIL WARDEN 0 ^ / ' ^ y^^/^yf//^ 
NOTICE is hereby given that I, Cheriff Mahi, do hereby request final dispos ition 
of any and all charges now pending against me in any court in the State of Utah. Charges 
of: 
Aggravated Robbery, 1st Degree Felony, Aggravated Burglary, 1st Degree Felony aid 
Aggravated Assault, 3 rd Degree Felony. Case Number 031903250. Third District Court. 
that are now pending against me in SALT LAKE COUNTY, and request is hereby made 
that you forward this notice to the appropriate authorities in that county or counties., 
together with such information as required by law. 
Dated this day of TTuKl 2003. 
Inmate: Cheriff Mahi Social Security Number: 3 7 ^ 7 8 ^ 8 / 7 
I hereby certify that I received a copy of the foregoing NOTICE this /S~~ day of 
Jofy , 20Q3 • 
Aumon^TAgent 
Q / A ^ g ^ Caw/y Jail, Utah 
